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Law and Economics literature on the subject of   party liability has identified a number of criteria 
which have come to be seen as cornerstones of this branch of law. One of these cornerstones is 
the principle by which it is not possible that there    be efficient levels of diligence and equally 
efficient levels of activity under tort party liability. The reasoning behind this is simple, and Coase 
had already established it in his 1960 article. A party which does not bear all of the social costs 
drives his activity to higher than optimal levels. The Chicago economist provided the example of 
homes being built near an airport, and wondered whether there was a need for double taxation. 
Over time, experts have identified scenarios in which at least one party chooses an efficient level 
of activity, but not both. 
 
These scenarios must be divided into different kind of hypothesis: unilateral accidents and those 
known as bilateral accidents. 
 
In the event of unilateral accident, the rule which leads to efficient care levels and equally high 
optimal activity level is the rule of strict liability. 
 
In the event of bilateral accident, we can imagine the following rules: strict liability with a defense 
(for instance with a defense of contributory negligence) or simple negligence.. 
 
Let us consider the first case, that of the unilateral accident and a liability, where the injurer 
indeed chooses an efficient activity level insofar as he is liable for all social costs:   the expected 
damage and the costs of precautions. In an attempt to minimize the private cost, he will 
contemporaneously  choose  the  efficient  activity  level.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  this  case, 
precisely  because  the  accident  in  question  is  a  unilateral  one,  the  victim  or  victims  cannot 
therefore take precautions, which are borne by the injurer, where other costs are not suggested. 
 
If we now consider the case of bilateral accidents we must keep in mind, first and foremost, that 
these types of accidents are characteristic because the social optimum is achieved if both parties 
take precautions. 
 
The most common line of reasoning in the case of strict liability with a defense (for example, in the 
case of contributory negligence) is that the injurer chooses the efficient activity level while the 
victim drives his activity to a level higher than the optimal. This is the point where the reasoning 
appears to be faulty. The injurer, in the case of strict liability with a defense, internalizes a large 
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number of the social costs, but not all. To be more specific, the injurer internalizes the expected 
damage and the costs of his precautions, but not the costs of the victim’s precautions. The 
consequence is that the private cost of the injurer is less than the social cost of his activity, and he 
will therefore choose an level of activity which is too high. 
 





















1 20 -10 -2 -4 6 10 
2 15 -10 -2 -4 6 5 
3 13 -10 -2 -4 6 3 




If we consider line three, we can note that, even when the injurer is strictly liable, however there 
is also the burden of the victim’s cost of precautions, the subject’s activity can be driven too high. 
 
Indeed, even if social welfare increases with level-3 activity, this does not represent a first-best 
solution.  If  the  injurer  had  failed  to  implement  activity,  the  victim  would  not  have  taken 
precautions and the   variation in social welfare would have been represented by the increase in 
the  victim’s  welfare,  which  is  6. The  problem of  liability  for  simple  negligence now  becomes 
apparent. In this case, the widespread tenet is that the injurer chooses an activity level which is 
too high while the victim identifies an efficient level of activity. The idea which lies at the basis of 
this reasoning is that the victim, in the case of simple negligence, bears all the total costs and 
therefore, in an attempt to minimize his private costs, minimizes the social ones as well. Even this 
reasoning, however, does not take into account the fact that some costs are not actually borne by 
the subject who should bear the burden of all the social costs. Indeed, the victim does not thus 
bear the injurer’s precaution costs and does not therefore choose an optimal activity level but 
















































1 20 -10 -4 -5 6 7 
2 18 -10 -4 -5 6 5 
3 16 -10 -4 -5 6 3 






In this example as well, the last level of activity taken into consideration leads to an increase in 
welfare, but it is not the best solution. The result would have been more desirable if the level-4 
activity had not been implemented. Indeed, the victim would have refrained from action, with the 
consequence  that  the  injurer  would  not  have  taken  precautions  in  the  amount  of  5  and  the 
increase in social welfare would have been 6. With the fourth level of activity, the increase in 
welfare is, on the other hand, only 2. 
 
The line of reasoning we have developed up to this point is of consequence if the victim in the first 
case and the injurer in the second are able to avoid taking precautions in the event in which the 
other party does not implement a further level of activity. If, on the other hand, precautions must 
be taken ex ante or, in other words, it is not possible to save on those precautions which are 
marginal, then social welfare is maximized if the injurer in the first example and the victim in the 
second implement their activities. 
 
It can therefore be stated that when one party, not bearing the costs of precaution because the 
other subject does not implement his activities, receives an increase in welfare greater than that 
which that party would have had if both parties had taken action. It is therefore better for society 
that the subject bearing the and transaction costs (but not those of the other party) not take 
action. 
 
We might wonder whether the Pigouvian tax, which effects beneficial decoupling, suffers from 
similar issues. 
 
The answer is yes. Indeed, the victim does not take into account the injurer’s costs of precaution. 


























1 15 -6 -2 - 3 14  -6 18 
2 14 -6 -2 -3 13 -6 16 
3 12 -6 -2 -3 11 -6 11 
4 8 -6 -2 -3 10 -6 7 
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It is apparent that level gives a social benefit of 7, although, if the victim had not implemented his 
action the increase in social welfare would have been 8 (in other words, only the benefit of the 
action for the injurer in absence of any cost). On the other hand, if the injurer had not implemented 
his action at level 4, there would have been an increase of 10 in welfare instead of that which 
was achieved, which was 7  
 
It  would  be  socially desirable  for both    parties  to  limit  its  activity,  even  in  the  presence  of 
Pigouvian tax, because both parties do not consider precaution costs of the other. Therefore, in the 
presence of a Pigouvian tax, if the injurer or the victim, going against their interests, refrains from 
implementing their activity, once a certain level of action is achieved, social welfare will increase. 
 
The question which remains open and merits more in-depth study is the issue regarding regulatory 
instruments which can be used to achieve an improvement in collective welfare in every case, 
although the well-known lesson that it is impossible to have efficient levels of care and 
contemporaneously efficient levels of activity remains valid. 
